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Wilson v. Arkansas: The "Knock & Announce" Rennaissance 
Philip S. Jackson 
Although characterized as a concept "woven in 
the fabric of early American law," and one now firmly 
"embedded in Anglo-American law," the Supreme 
Court has only recently, in Wilson v. Arkansas, 1 formal-
ly recognized that the "knock and announce" require-
ment remains a viable aspect of the Fourth Amend-
ment's reasonableness requirement. 2 Notwithstanding 
the Court's characterization, in some quarters the hold-
ing in Wilson was viewed as a new twist in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 3 This stir was undoubtedly 
caused by the Court's finding that at the time of the 
Constitution's framing, the common law required that 
a law enforcement officer announce his presence and 
authority prior to breaking into a residence when exe-
cuting a search and seizure warrant. Basing its holding 
upon that finding, the Court unanimously held that this 
common law "knock and announce" principle consti-
tutes a part of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness 
requirement. Consequently, when weighing the rea-
sonableness of the execution of a search warrant in 
order to determine the admissibility of any evidence 
derived therefrom, a judge must consider whether an 
executing officer has complied with the "knock and 
announce" rule. 
Any surprise that followed this decision was 
perhaps spawned by the infrequent litigation of this 
particular issue in state courts, both at the trial and 
appellate levels. In fact, the most recently reported 
opinion of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
which squarely addressed a "knock and announce" 
issue dates from 1972. 4 Similarly, consequential discus-
sion of the issue by the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
has not been undertaken since the first term of the 
Johnson Administration.5 
Nevertheless, as Justice Thomas observed in 
the majority opinion of Wilson, the "knock and an-
nounce" requirement hardly qualifies as a change in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because it originates 
from Thirteenth Century common law. Maryland ap-
pellate opinions which have addressed the issue confirm 
16 - U. Bait. L.F. /26.2 
the vintage of the "knock and announce" require-
ment,6 and its source in the common law. 7 
Ask any criminal practitioner, and he or she 
would likely confirm that since the advent of the "War 
on Drugs," law enforcement officers have increasing-
ly executed search and seizure warrants without first 
warning occupants of their intention to enter. Wilson 
will likely bring renewed scrutiny to this long dormant 
area of the law. Therefore, this article is devoted to 
a brief analysis of the Wilson case specifically, and 
"knock and announce" law generally. 
The Wilson Case 
In late 1992, Sharlene Wilson allegedly made 
a series of sales of various controlled substances to an 
informant who was acting under the supervision of an 
Arkansas State Police officer. At least two of these 
transactions had some nexus to a residence Wilson 
shared with another individual. Based upon those 
sales, and apparently precipitated by a threat made by 
Wilson to the informant, the investigating officers 
applied for and obtained a search warrant for Wilson's 
residence. 
When executing the warrant, the officers dis-
covered the front door ofWilson' s residence open and 
the outlying screen door unlocked. Opening the 
screen door, the officers proceeded inside while si-
multaneously identifying themselves as police officers 
there to execute a warrant. The officers caught 
Wilson in the process of flushing marijuana down a 
toilet. In completing execution of the warrant, the 
officers also recovered other types of controlled 
substances along with various accoutrements of the 
narcotics trade, including a gun and ammunition. 
Wilson was indicted and later convicted on a 
variety of narcotics-related charges. In pretrial sup-
pression motions and on appeal, 8 Wilson argued for 
the suppression of all evidence procured by the search 
on the grounds that the police failed to knock and 
announce their presence before entering her residence 
and conducting the search. Wilson averred that the 
police had thereby violated the reasonableness standard 
of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court of 
Arkansas summarily dismissed the contention that the 
Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement officers 
to knock and announce their presence before executing 
a search warrant.9 Upon granting writ of certiorari, the 
United States Supreme Court, in noticeable contrast to 
the Supreme Court of Arkansas, focused on the knock 
and announce issue. Speaking for a unanimous Court, 
Justice Thomas wrote that the Fourth Amendment did 
indeed encompass a requirement that police officers 
executing a warrant must first knock on the door 
through which they intend to enter, identify themselves 
as law enforcement agents, and announce their presence 
and purpose prior to entrance of the residence. While 
recognizing that circumstances can obviate the neces-
sity of this prerequisite, the Court reversed the holding 
of the Arkansas Supreme Court, and remanded the case 
for further factual findings. 
Significantly, the Court recognized that police 
need not knock and announce at the execution of every 
search and seizure warrant. As the Court bluntly stated, 
"This is not to say, of course, that every entry must be 
preceded by an announcement. The Fourth Amend-
ment's flexible requirement of reasonableness should 
not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that 
ignores countervailing law enforcement interests."lo 
Rather, the Court merely redressed the erroneous view 
held by the Arkansas Supreme Court that under the 
instant facts a "knock and announce" issue was not 
raised at all. 
Despite recognizing the existence of exceptions 
to its holding, the Court failed to expressly enumerate 
the exceptions. The Court left "to the lower courts the 
task of determining the circumstances under which an 
unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment."ll This lack of guidance creates uncer-
tainty in jurisdictions, such as Maryland, which suffer 
from a dearth of case law addressing the issue. State 
courts who will soon be assaying "knock and an-
nounce" matters will be forced to adjudicate the issue 
without much mandatory legal authority. However, a 
plethora offederal cases exist which have examined the 
issue. Now that it has been held that the "knock and 
viewed as highly persuasive case law. 12 
Knock, Announce & Wait: The Case Law 
One reason for the amount offederallaw exist-
ing on this issue is the statutory "knock and announce" 
rule at 18 U. S. C. section 3 109 Y This statute has 
eliminated the need for the federal practitioner to be a 
diviner of the common law, and has thereby made the 
"knock and announce" rule more accessible. In perti-
nent part, the statute allows a federal officer to "break 
open any outer or inner door or window of a house . . 
. to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his 
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance .... "14 
Although the statute is laid out in express terms, it has 
been construed as merely expressive of the common law 
rule. 15 Because exceptions exist to the common law 
rule, the interpretation of the rule has been less than 
absolute. What immediately stands out upon review of 
the case law on this issue, is that "knock and announce" 
is perhaps a bit of a misnomer. The courts have 
repeatedly held and section 3109 explicitly states that 
the "knock and announce" rule contemplates not only 
a rap on the door and an identifying announcement, but 
also a refusal of entry by an occupant before a law officer 
can force an entrance. A more cumbersome but more 
accurate shorthand for the rule would be "knock, 
announce and wait." As the Wilson Court observed: 
"the constant practice at common law was that the 
officer may break open the door, if he be sure the 
offender is therein, if after acquainting them of the 
business, and demanding the prisoner, he refuses to 
open the door."16 
Of the component requirements of the "knock 
and announce" rule, the "refusal" element has proved 
most problematic. After all, the mechanics of knocking 
on a door, identifying oneself as a law officer and then 
indicating one's purpose at the residence's threshold 
should be readily assimilable by police. In a long settled 
Supreme Court case, Miller v. United States,17 the 
Court held that a police officer violated section 3109 
when he knocked upon the door, merely identified 
himself by saying, "Police," and then forced his way in 
without indicating his purpose. IS Since Miller, there 
have been few reported decisions on these aspects of the 
Issue. 
announce" requirement is an indispensable facet of the However, the refusal prong of the "knock and 
Fourth Amendment, the federal case law will likely be announce" rule has garnered much appellate attention. 
26.21 U. BaIt. L.F. - 17 
In a nutshell, the law demands that prior to forcing 
entry, either an explicit refusal of admittance or a lapse 
oftime is necessary if no exigency exists. 19 An affirma-
tive refusal is not required. Rather, circumstances may 
exist which constitute a constructive refusal by which 
the occupant's refusal may reasonably be inferred. 20 
Discussion of the doctrine of constructive or 
inferred refusal is pervasive in the cases addressing the 
refusal aspect of the "knock and announce" rule. This 
is because an overt refusal is not susceptible to interpre-
tation, whereas silence in the face of a demand for entry 
can be ambiguous. Under such circumstances, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has 
held that the failure of a residence's occupants to 
respond within a reasonable time is tantamount to a 
refusal. That court further characterized "a reasonable 
time" as "ordinarily very brief. "21 In terms of actual 
time, courts have held intervals of as little as from five 
to ten seconds between announcement and entry to be 
sufficient to infer refusal. 22 However, there is simply no 
hard and fast quantum of time that will, in all cases, be 
viewed as reasonable. 
As a practical matter, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has recog-
nized that the execution of a search warrant targeting 
drug traffickers presents a more hazardous situation 
than the execution of a warrant targeting many other 
crimes. Thus, the D. C. Circuit has held that officers may 
quite reasonably infer refusal more readily when inves-
tigating drug cases than under other circumstances.23 
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit upheld the propriety of an entry by police 
only "moments" after their announcement where the 
police were executing a warrant at the residence of a 
drug trafficker reasonably believed to be in possession 
of weapons. 24 
In sum, there is no bright-line rule oflaw readily 
applicable to the analysis of a "refusal" issue. The 
courts have addressed constructive refusal on a case by 
case basis, allowing police to infer refusal after the lapse 
of a much shorter period of time in drug and violent 
crime situations than that period of time needed to lapse 
when investigating non-violent crimes and criminals. In 
doing so, the various federal Circuits have employed the 
same type of sliding-scale analysis that the Supreme 
Court has recently utilized in its decisions on the 
reasonableness aspect of the Fourth Amendment. 25 
18 - U. Bait. L.F. 126.2 
The Rule's Exceptions 
There exists a temptation for defense attorneys 
to cite Wilson for the proposition that in all warrant 
execution situations law enforcement agents must first 
knock, announce and await refusal before entry. How-
ever, as discussed above, the Supreme Court in Wilson 
clearly recognized that exceptions to the rule exist. 
Again, the federal case law should prove instructive for 
the Maryland practitioner. 
In sum, these cases hold that "exigent circum-
stances" eliminate the duty of an officer to strictly 
comply with the "knock and announce" rule. 26 In fact, 
exigent circumstances can excuse the complete failure 
to knock, announce or await refusal. 27 Simply put, 
where the crimes or criminals under investigation are 
not violent and where the evidence is not easily disposed 
of (i. e., a forgery investigation where the suspect has no 
record), a court will be hard pressed to find an exigent 
circumstance that would justify a forced entry without 
a knock and announcement. On the other end of the 
spectrum, a warrant related to a serial murder investi-
gation could probably safely proceed without comply-
ing with the formalities of the "knock and announce" 
rule. Of course, most cases fall somewhere in the middle 
of those two extremes. 
Recently, courts have addressed how exigency 
determinations should be affected when the crime in-
vestigated is some type of narcotics offense. As previ-
ously mentioned herein, officers investigating narcotics 
cases are only required to wait a very short time between 
the announcement oftheir presence and purpose and the 
forced entry. The reasons for the short duration are that 
narcotics evidence can be quickly and easily disposed 
of, and that narcotics traffickers present a danger to 
police because they are usually armed. For the same 
reasons, courts have been prone in narcotics cases to 
waive the need for a knock and announcement altogeth-
er. 28 
However, not every execution of a warrant 
seeking evidence of narcotics will present an exigent 
circumstance situation. The Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit rejected a bright-line approach in United 
States v. Lalor. 29 The court explained, "[t]here is no 
support for the proposition that each and every narcot-
ics search carries a risk that evidence will be de-
stroyed. "30 In order to constitute an "exigent circum-
stance" exception, there must exist in each case a 
particularized, articulated basis for the belief that the 
evidence will be destroyed. A contrary rule "would 
totally eviscerate the Fourth Amendment, and could 
easily be expanded to include searches for any item that 
is easily disposed of."3! Ironically, Henson v. State,32 
one of the few Maryland cases that has dealt with a 
"knock and announce" issue, seems to hold to the 
contrary. 33 However, because the Wilson holding is 
closely aligned with the case by case analysis propound-
ed in Lalor, it is likely that the rule of law in Lalor and 
not Henson will prevail in the future in Maryland 
appellate courts. 
Lalor also provides an example of where the 
dangerousness of an individual under investigation can 
provide the exigent circumstance which allows a police 
officer to forgo the formality of complying with the 
"knock and announce" rule. In Lalor, the officer had 
executed a warrant for the seizure of narcotics, but had 
forced entry without knocking, announcing or awaiting 
refusaP4 The officer justified his actions by claiming: 
(1) that he knew through his training and experience 
that drugs can be readily destroyed, (2) that the defen-
dant had previously been arrested in possession of a 
weapon, (3) that the defendant had been surly with the 
police on another occasion, and (4) that firearms are 
commonly used by narcotics traffickers. 35 Although the 
Fourth Circuit rejected the blanket assertion ofnarcot-
ics' evanescence as an exigent circumstance, the court 
upheld the forced entry on the grounds ofthe articulated 
police safety concerns.36 
Another example of where concern for officer 
safety proved to be an exigent circumstance can be 
found in United States v. Ramirez.37 In Ramirez, a 
forced entry without a knock and announcement was 
held lawful where the lead officer executing a search 
warrant late at night was advised through police teletype 
that the defendant was considered armed and danger-
OUS. 38 
Often it is the combination of the crime under 
investigation and the criminal targeted by the investiga-
tion that provides the articulable basis for a forced entry 
without satisfying the "knock and announce" require-
ments. A recent example of this scenario was described 
in United States v. Kennedy.39 In that case, although the 
officers conducting a narcotics raid only announced 
"Police" while simultaneously battering down the door, 
the court upheld the propriety of the warrant's execu-
tion. The articulated reasons for the exigency were that 
the police knew that the targets were experienced drug 
dealers who would likely attempt to destroy evidence, 
that a pre-raid surveillance revealed heavy traffic in and 
out of the residence indicative of an ongoing narcotics 
enterprise, that firearms are common in drug transac-
tions, and that several individuals who had been identi-
fied as co-conspirators in the group targeted by the 
warrant had violent pasts. 40 The lesson of Kennedy 
seems to be that, although the court will consider 
generalities (i.e., that narcotics crimes frequently in-
volve firearms), the police must have case-specific facts 
of that tendency before they opt to force entry without 
complying with the "knock and announce" rule. 
"No-Knock" Warrants 
In what is sure to be one of the more vexing 
issues tied to the impending onslaught of "knock and 
announce" law, the matter of "no-knock" warrants 
will surely garner attention. A "no-knock" warrant is, 
in essence, a pre-authorized, judicially issued license 
allowing law enforcement officers to force entry in the 
execution of a search warrant without satisfaction ofthe 
"knock and announce" rule. A "no-knock" warrant is 
generally effected when the issuing judge includes a 
clause in the actual search warrant that, in effect, 
sanctions non-compliance with the "knock and an-
nounce" rule. The "no-knock" provision in a warrant 
is presumably based upon facts articulated in the war-
rant affidavit. 
While some federal circuits have dealt with the 
evidentiary use of the fruits of a search executed 
pursuant to a "no-knock" warrant,4! there is not one 
reported decision from a Maryland appellate court on 
the validity, effect, or implications of "no-knock" 
warrants. This is surprising, given the dramatic increase 
in the use of "no-knock" warrants over the course of 
the last few years. 
Two potential problems exist regarding "no-
knock" warrants. The first is whether judges have the 
power to issue such warrants. The statutory authoriza-
tion to issue search warrants contains no indication of 
whether judges have the power to issue warrants that 
direct the specific manner of a warrant's execution.42 
A second potential area of contention is con-
nected with the "Good-Faith Exception" to the Fourth 
Amendment's exclusionary rule. 43 Suppose that not-
26.21 U. Bait. L.F. - 19 
withstanding the failure of an affidavit to articulate 
exigent circumstances sufficient to allow the officers to 
avoid the "knock and announce" requirement, a judge 
nonetheless issues a "no-knock" warrant. Should the 
"Good Faith Exception" save the fruits of any search 
carried out under that warrant? The federal circuits that 
have addressed the issue have responded resoundingly 
to that question in the affirmative.44 In all three cases, 
a state court judge had authorized a "no-knock" 
warrant based on an affidavit later found deficient. The 
fruits of those searches were nonetheless saved by 
applying the "Good Faith Exception" to the police 
conduct. The underlying rationale for its application is 
best summed in United States v. Moland, 45 where the 
court held that although the "Good Faith Exception" 
does not typically apply to the improper execution of a 
warrant, the exception does apply where the execution 
was in accordance with the terms of the warrant. 46 
While the authority is not definitive, at least in this 
limited area, the federal courts have lent some guidance. 
Conclusion 
The logical consequence of the Wilson case is 
that a new and unprecedented amount of "knock and 
announce" issues will soon be litigated in Maryland. 
While Maryland precedents do not greatly assist the 
practitioner in this particular area, the federal courts 
have already satisfactorily addressed many of the same 
issues that will no doubt be raised in the near future. The 
federal courts' interpretation teaches that each case 
should be weighed on its own merits. In that light, the 
successful practitioner will be the one who develops 
facts conducive to the balancing, sliding-scale type of 
analysis that this issue demands. 
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